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This thesis investigates the determinants of participation in microfinance programmes and its 
impact on rural welfare in order to suggest improvements to the level of participation and the 
effectiveness of the programmes. The level of participation by rural smallholders in Botswana is 
much lower than expected in spite of the availability of schemes and their ease of access.  The 
study uses one of National Development Bank Botswana’s credit schemes in Kweneng District to 
investigate this problem. A field survey was carried out on 112 smallholder farmers, half of whom 
are scheme participants, to establish what factors affect the probability of their participation in the 
scheme. The study applied a logit model to determine which variables significantly affected the 
probability of participation in the credit scheme. The results indicated that some variables like 
gender and educational status had little effect on the probability of participation. A number of 
policy variables which include age, previous experience of credit use, respondents’ perception of 
group collateral, distance from the National Development Bank, access to irrigation and total 
landholding size were found to have a significant effect. On the welfare effect, more than half of 
participants in the microfinance credit scheme indicated that their welfare improved as a direct 
result of the programme. As future research, it would be useful if the study could be extended to 
all districts of the country to enable the generalization of findings and provide valuable information 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
Over the last 60 years, credit programmes have been set up in most developing countries by 
governments and donors with the aim of improving the access to credit of rural households. A 
great number of these, especially the ‘agricultural development banks’, have failed to significantly 
alleviate poverty or to be financially sustainable. Most rural households continue to rely on the 
informal market for their inter-temporal transfer of resources. Therefore, outreach of financial 
institutions and access to financial services has become a major issue in microfinance, and 
particularly in rural finance (Diagne et al. 2001; Meyer, 2015). 
 
According to the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD, 2011) and the Africa 
Progress Panel among others, Africa needs to unlock its agriculture potential in order to unlock its 
development. Farming is the primary source of livelihood in Africa: over two-thirds of its citizens 
depend on agriculture and its related industries for their livelihoods. Investing in agriculture will 
go a long way towards reducing poverty in Africa. According to an FAO sectoral analysis, 
agricultural sector growth is preferable to growth in other sectors as it is 11 times more effective 
at alleviating poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. About a third of the continent’s GDP is derived from 
agriculture, with the proportion being significantly higher for many sub-Saharan countries. 
Smallholder farmers can contribute significantly to lifting their communities out of poverty and 
stimulating the economy. Providing them with access to finance for their agricultural activities 
enables them to generate more income, creating a multiplier effect as it enables them to educate 
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their children, access better healthcare and invest in small business activities to diversify their 
income. All of this contributes to help lift their community out of poverty for the long term. 
Research by ONE, a global advocacy group founded by U2 lead singer Bono found that crucially, 
if women farmers in Africa received equal investment, agricultural productivity could be raised by 
20-30%, which would reduce the numbers of those facing starvation by 100-150 million, increase 
output available for the markets, increase incomes and reduce dependency for women, and provide 
more food for children (ONE, 2014). 
 
Unlike most of Africa where majority of smallholders are left out of the rural financial system, 
many reports, notably Akinboade (1998) suggest that in Botswana there are multiple government 
programmes and credit houses offering services to the rural community. In addition, the low 
population density means that land constraints, which are the second biggest stumbling block for 
most of Africa’s rural communities from maximizing the benefits that access to credit offers, is 
less of a consideration. Botswana’s National Development Bank (NDB), and the Citizen 
Entrepreneurship Development Agency (CEDA), are still providing access to finance to rural 
farmers while their peers have mostly shut down or been offloaded by governments all over Africa. 
In Botswana, like in most developing countries, there is also a significant number of informal 
financial sector (IFS) organisations. These include money lenders, Rotating Saving and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs), Cooperative Schemes, pawnshops, and small professional microfinance 
institutions (Okurut and Botlhole, 2006; Ledgerwood et al, 2013). However, in spite of the 
multiple government financed credit schemes and the ease of access to these schemes, participation 
is low in the rural areas where farming is predominantly done by smallholder farmers (NDB, 
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2014). The NDB and CEDA both report that a very high proportion of the funds available for 
credit to farmers are unused because of lack of applicants. It is not clear at this stage why 
participation in these schemes are so low, and what characteristics are shared by those who make 
the decision to participate in them, as no research has specifically addressed the issue to date, 
leading to the decision to undertake this study.  
 
The population of Botswana is currently estimated to be about 2 million, and it is classified as an 
upper middle income country, with per capita income in excess of 5,000 US Dollars (LEA, 2014). 
Botswana’s economic performance improved in 2013, with a diversification drive yielding a GDP 
growth rate of 5.4% mainly driven by service oriented sectors, notably trade, transport and 
communications, though mining and agriculture still happen to be the main economic activities 
(ADB, 2014). The National Development Bank of Botswana (NDB) was established under an Act 
of Parliament in 1963. It is owned by the Government of Botswana and managed by a Board of 
Directors appointed by the Minister of Finance and Development Planning. According to its 
information booklet, NDB’s main activity is the provision of finance to the business sector in order 
to stimulate growth and entrepreneurship, while aiming to earn satisfactory returns and be 
sustainable. As a Development Financial Institution (DFI), NDB plays a vital role in the execution 
of national strategy. Job creation, economic diversification, the promotion of local enterprise, the 
development of agriculture, the alleviation of poverty especially in the rural areas and a reduction 
of rural-urban migration are key strategic objectives included in Botswana’s Vision 2016 and the 
National Development Plan prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning 
(MFDP). NDB continues to contribute immensely to these objectives and the growth of the local 
economy in general. NDB supports the business community regardless of size or sector they may 
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operate in. The range of clients include small, medium or large-scale enterprises and/or projects. 
They however have some schemes that are targeted at specific sectors, depending on which 
sectors’ development the government policy is prioritising at any one time. In 1998, NDB became 
the first bank on the African continent to be certified under ISO 9001:2000 International Quality 
Standards. Some of the activities that NDB finances are Manufacturing, Commercial/Retail, 
Agriculture, Human Capital Development and Property. NDB is also the primary provider of 
formal finance to smallholder farmers in Botswana through its Temo Bokamoso loan scheme 
(TBCS). This scheme was launched in 2008 in order to encourage agricultural activity in the rural 
areas to alleviate poverty and stem the flow of rural-urban migration. The scheme is for loans of 
up to P250, 000 (USD25, 000) for terms of up to a maximum of 7 years (NDB, 2013). 
 
Botswana’s population is largely rural, with farming being the main activity after mining. 
Kweneng district is situated just outside Gaborone and is a rural agricultural district with a 
significant population of smallholder farmers whose participation rate in the Temo Bokamoso 
credit scheme is around the national average (NDB, 2013). Agricultural activity in Kweneng 
focuses on vegetable cultivation on smallholdings of under 10 hectares on average (Statistics 
Botswana, 2014). Participants in the Temo Bokamoso Credit Scheme rely on it for a number of 
purposes: the purchase of seasonal inputs (ploughing costs, seeds, fertilizer, maintenance costs, 
etc); field development (fencing, de-stumping, etc.); field purchase (Only fields with title deeds 
are financed); purchase of farm machinery and implements (tractors, boreholes drilling and 
equipping, threshers, chaff cutters etc); and the purchase of farm vehicles, e.g. vans/bakkies, 
trailers, carts etc. 
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Income inequalities and poverty within rural communities can be reduced by financial 
development (Aghion, Caroli & Garcia-Penalosa, 1999; Meyer, 2015). The NDB, through its 
Temo Bokamoso loan scheme thus has a key role to play in improving the lives of Botswana’s 
rural populations, who would have difficulty accessing finance through traditional formal financial 
institutions. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
Many studies have been undertaken in Africa on the impact that access to credit has on rural 
households’ welfare, and especially on poverty alleviation (Diagne et al, 2001; Udry, 1991; Meyer, 
2015). The main limitations of those studies centred on the fact that access to formal credit is very 
limited in most countries, and for those who do have access, their landholdings are mostly too 
small to maximize the benefits of access to credit.  
 
Very limited empirical research has been performed in this area in Botswana. Conditions in 
Botswana also happen to be different, which is rare in Africa. There is significant access to formal 
finance with NDB, CEDA, LEA and multiple other finance houses having schemes that target 
rural households. TBSC provides easy loans to rural farmers with little security and CEDA through 
its Young Farmers’ Fund (YFF) for instance, provides finance for youth under 35 years of age who 
would be interested in taking up farming on a full time basis. Due to the low population density, 
there are also land reserves available for allocation by the rural land boards for those indigenes 
interested in farming smallholdings. These conditions are ideal for studying the determinants of 
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participation in credit schemes, the contribution to rural welfare made by participation in credit 
schemes and how participation levels can be improved.  
 
“A household has access to a particular source of credit if it is able to borrow from that source, 
although for a variety of reasons it may choose not to. The extent of access to credit is measured 
by the maximum amount a household can borrow (its credit limit). If this amount is positive, the 
household is said to have access. A household is said to be participating if it is borrowing from a 
source of credit” (Diagne et al. 2001). Given the relative ease of access in Botswana, NDB’s 2013 
annual report claims that participation in the Temo Bokamoso credit scheme is still quite low 
among smallholder farmers. CEDA’s YFF is also not succeeding in attracting significant numbers 
of young farmers to participate in the scheme. This raises a question about what factors determine 
participation in these formal credit schemes. Additionally, the question arises whether participation 
in schemes like the Temo Bokamoso really significantly improves the livelihoods and productivity 
of participants. These schemes are funded by the Botswana government as policy tools to stimulate 
agriculture and alleviate poverty. Thus the low participation is a national problem that this study 
seeks to investigate. If the factors that determine participation can be established, then it would be 
possible to structure and manage these schemes in a manner that will ensure higher participation 
rates. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
This study aims to identify, analyze and examine the major socio-economic determinants of rural 
smallholders’ participation in micro-finance and its impact on their livelihoods, using NDB’s 
Temo Bokamoso Credit Scheme as a case study. This scheme was chosen because it is the only 
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scheme that specifically targets agricultural smallholders in the rural areas in order to improve 
their livelihoods and reduce rural-urban migration. Other schemes were considered less suitable 
for this research because they target women, or youth without necessarily expecting them to be 
residents in rural areas. They also finance other entrepreneurial activities besides farming. In order 
to address the research problem, the following research questions were formulated: 
 
(i) What are the determinants of participation in the NDB’s Temo Bokamoso credit 
scheme for agricultural smallholders in the Kweneng district of Botswana?  
(ii) How does participation in the NDB’s Temo Bokamoso credit scheme affect the 
incomes and productivity of agricultural smallholders in Kweneng district of 
Botswana? 
(iii)  How can participation in the NDB’s Temo Bokamoso credit scheme and its 
effectiveness be improved for agricultural smallholders in Kweneng district of 
Botswana?   
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
(i) To investigate the determinants of participation in the NDB’s Temo Bokamoso credit 
scheme for agricultural smallholders in the Kweneng district of Botswana. 
(ii) To examine the effect of participation in the NDB’s Temo Bokamoso credit scheme on 




(iii) To recommend approaches to improving participation in the NDB’s Temo Bokamoso 
credit scheme and the effectiveness of credit providers to agricultural smallholdings in 
Botswana. 
 
1.5 Research hypotheses 
(i) H1: Participation in the NDB’s Temo Bokamoso credit scheme by agricultural 
smallholders in the Kweneng district of Botswana is determined by socio-economic 
characteristics of the farmer, as well as the farm characteristics and institutional 
factors. 
(ii) H2:  Participation in the NDB’s Temo Bokamoso credit scheme leads to an 
improvement in the incomes and productivity of agricultural smallholders in Kweneng 
District of Botswana.  
 
1.6 Significance of the study 
The welfare of poor households in developing countries, especially in rural areas is constrained by 
lack of access to credit. For this reason most policy and research interest tends to focus on the 
improvement of access to credit and its impact on household welfare. This research perspective 
makes the rational assumption that the poor would participate if they had access to credit in order 
to finance both consumption and their entrepreneurial aspirations. (Dufhues and Buchenreider, 
2005; Ledgerwood et al, 2013). An important subject to ponder for policy makers in Botswana is 
why enabling access to credit doesn’t always  lead to increased participation, and when it does, 




Formal rural credit is considered by the Batswana government to be a powerful tool for poverty 
reduction (NDB 2013). The government tried to break the dominance of the informal sector and 
push development by supplying credit on preferential terms, particularly to rural households 
through the NDB. The Botswana government has in this manner so far succeeded in providing a 
huge share of the population with formal credit. However, despite the immense formal outreach, 
the participation of formal credit is still quite low. 
 
Any research undertaking must be purposeful and systematic (Buttel and McMichael, 2005). Thus 
the solid basis for this proposed research rests upon the foregoing premises: to investigate the 
determinants of participation in the NDB’s Temo Bokamoso credit scheme for agricultural 
smallholders in the Kweneng district of Botswana; determine the effect of participation in the 
NDB’s Temo Bokamoso credit scheme on the incomes and productivity of these agricultural 
smallholders; and the role of credit participation in achieving food security. It will also generate 
recommendations for policies to improve the welfare of the agricultural smallholders in the 
Kweneng district of Botswana. It will draw wider implications for policy makers like NDB, 
CEDA, and LEA to boost the overall subsector performance; and finally be able to build on the 
existing body of knowledge as there is an acute paucity of empirical research conducted in this 







   CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Review of major theoretical models 
The theoretical models used to study and understand the determinants of participation in the Temo 
Bokamoso scheme are in two main groups. First, there are the models that explain why any rural 
smallholder or investor would choose a particular source of finance or combination of sources, 
including the loanable funds, liquidity preference and pecking order theories (Ndede, 2015). These 
three theories explain some of the factors that may have an influence on participation in a credit 
scheme. The second group of models provides the historical context in which financial markets 
developed, review how credit markets operate and what assumptions underlie the way they are 
structured (Conning and Udry, 2007). 
 
2.1.1 Participation in credit markets 
2.1.1.1 Loanable Funds Theory  
One of the avenues available to firms and individuals for obtaining funding to finance their 
operations is the banks and other financial institutions which provide loans (Adekanye & 
Adedoyin, 1992; Pooter et al, 2015). Individuals and institutions who require funds seek out those 
who have them. The disbursement of the funds however needs to be motivated, so a price in the 
form of interest is charged by the providers of the funds to those in need of them. The interest rate 
is the price of the financial service provided with all other economic factors held constant (Ndede, 
2015).The loanable funds theory states that how much funds are supplied to the market depends 
on the level of demand for money in the market and the interest rate (Mishkin, 2009). By the same 
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token, the demand for money depends on the interest rate and money supply, ceteris paribus. High 
interest rates would attract a high supply of money as the owners of funds are attracted by the high 
rates, but would discourage demand. When interest rates are low demand increases while supply 
is withdrawn from the market. The market equilibrium is at the point where the quantity demanded 
equals the volume that loan providers would supply at a given interest rate. The classic loanable 
funds theory developed by Robertson and Ohlin (1930) basically states that the interest rate is 
determined by the demand and supply for loanable funds, therefore implying that participation in 
a credit scheme (demand) would depend on the supply of credit being available at a rate that is 
lower than the participants can obtain elsewhere. 
 
2.1.1.2 Liquidity Preference Theory  
Keynes (1936) developed the liquidity preference theory which states that the rate of interest is 
determined by liquidity preference, and not demand and supply for money. Interest according to 
Keynesian theory, is the reward for giving up liquidity, thus the longer the period required, the 
higher the price charged. A lender with a high liquidity preference, meaning they would rather 
have cash than any other asset, would prefer short term over long term loans (Joy, 1977; Pandey, 
2003; and Meyer, 2015). There are three motives for the demand for liquidity: the transactions 
motive; the precautionary motive and the speculative motive. The transactions motive refers to the 
need to meet day to day expenses. The precautionary motive is that people feel a need to hold 
money in case of eventualities and the speculative motive is in order to take advantage of 
opportunities (Keynes, 1936). The implication of the liquidity preference theory is that the term of 
the loan is a significant consideration in the demand for credit. In addition to the interest rate 
charged, another determinant for participation in a credit scheme is therefore theorized to be loan 
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terms offered by the scheme (Ndede, 2015). All other things being equal, farmers would prefer a 
longer to a shorter term loan, or they would like the credit available to them to match their cash 
flow cycles. 
 
2.1.1.3 Pecking Order Theory  
The pecking order theory was developed by Myers and Majluf (1984). It attempts to explain how 
firms select their capital structure. According to the theory, firms prioritise internal sources of 
finance, followed by debt, with the raising of new equity serving as a last resort. La Rocca et al 
(2009) develop this further, suggesting that firms should always employ a hierarchical approach 
when sourcing their finance needs. Pecking Order Theory is very relevant to this study because 
rural farmers tend to finance their business activities largely by themselves, then friends and 
family, before looking externally (Okurut et al 2009). Participation in the Temo Bokamoso 
Scheme would depend to an extent on how strongly the rural smallholders of Kweneng adhere to 
this theory. 
 
2.1.2 Models of financial market development 
From a historical perspective, theories on the development of rural financial markets developed 
alongside and were significantly influenced by more general theories of information asymmetries, 
banking and corporate finance (Stiglitz, 2002). A paper by Stiglitz (1974) on “Incentives and risk 
sharing in sharecropping” investigated the impact of moral hazard on the structure of labor, 
insurance and credit and equity contracts, significantly influencing subsequent research.  Akerlof 
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(1970) was inspired by informal rural moneylenders in India in his analysis of adverse selection 
or the ‘lemons problem’ (Conning and Udry, 2007). 
 
2.1.2.1 The complete markets theory 
The theory of complete markets developed by Arrow and Debreu (1954) is a benchmark model 
for subsequent models of financial contracting. In a complete market the full set of possible bets 
on future states-of-the-world can be developed with current assets without friction. There are no 
transaction costs and every market agent can contract either directly or indirectly with every other 
market agent to exchange every existing good. The definition of a good in complete markets is 
state-contingent, including the time and environment the good is consumed in. For example, an 
ice cream on a hot day is a different good from an ice cream on that same day if it is cold. A market 
is complete if an agent can simultaneously enter into any position regarding any future state of the 
market. A state of the world is a complete description of a possible outcome of uncertainty. 
Regarding the market as a village, the consumption of each household increases the average village 
consumption. Idiosyncratic shocks to household income are pooled at the village level so that, a 
household’s consumption is not affected by its idiosyncratic income. Elaborate mechanisms to 
verify states and efficiently side-contract to redistribute resources between individuals in every 
state of the world are assumed to exist to enable this efficient risk sharing. (Conning and Udry, 
2007; Ibtissem and Bouri, 2013).  
 
2.1.2.2 Efficient risk sharing hypotheses 
A number of hypotheses have emerged from the complete markets model and these have been 
widely tested in rural financial markets around the world. Townsend (1994) conducted a study in 
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rural India and found that there was risk pooling among the villagers, but rejected the hypothesis 
of full consumption smoothing. Risk sharing has been tested in a varying range of  social groups, 
and each one of them found that while there was partial evidence of risk sharing within the group, 
it was not Pareto-efficient (Conning and Udry, 2007). Udry (1994) also rejected the hypothesis of 
risk sharing in a study of households in Northern Nigeria. Dercon and Krishnan (2000) performed 
a similar study on households in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Ethiopia, and found that there limited 
evidence of efficient risk sharing within the same household. The conclusion that can be drawn 
from these empirical studies is that risk-sharing is more effective within subgroups in a village and 
there are forms of imperfect consumption smoothing within rural financial markets.  
 
2.1.2.3 Significance of imperfect financial markets 
Even if a group manages to pool their risks in an efficient manner, the individuals who make up 
the group would still be exposed because agents need to be physically present to be able to enforce 
state-contingent risk-sharing arrangements and this will expose these individuals to interconnected 
risks (Conning and Udry, 2007). For instance, a drought will affect all the farmers in the same 
village so it will not make sense to exchange risks with each other. They would be better off 
exchanging risks with individuals in a community that is not affected by the same conditions. Since 
it may neither be cost-effective or convenient for each individual to separately seek out and 
contract with someone in a different community, specialized financial intermediaries are needed 
to facilitate the pooling of risks and make the cost of the transaction more amenable. This 
intermediation completes the market and enables society to benefit from participating in financial 




2.1.2.4 Relevance of asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement for financial 
contracts 
Considering that financial intermediation can help to complete markets, questions then arise as to 
why it fails to lead to efficient contracting with risk sharing agreements even in small communities 
and what motivates the reluctance of diversified financial intermediaries to enter rural financial 
markets?  Conning and Udry (2007) suggest that it is due to asymmetric information. In the event 
of a farmer’s harvest failing it is not possible for a lender to determine whether it is due to natural 
causes or because the farmer failed to act with diligence, or simply misrepresented the situation. 
If the complete markets theory were realistic, with complete information it would be possibly for 
the lender to detect potential contract breaches and take corrective action at no additional cost.  
Asymmetric information and enforcement problems however prevent this (Ibtissem and Bouri, 
2013). Asymmetric information is directly responsible for about 40% of the defaults in South 
Africa’s credit markets (Karlan and Zinman, (2004).  
 
2.1.2.5 The Moral hazard problem 
A moral hazard is any situation in which one party to a transaction takes the decision about how 
much risk to take, while another party bears the cost if things go badly (Krugman, 2009). This 
happens due to asymmetric information in rural financial contracts, as the lender cannot accurately 
foresee the actions of the borrower. A lender would be reluctant to rollover a loan if a farmer 
claims to have lost his harvest to poor weather, unless other farmers in the area suffered the same 
fate (Townsend 2003). In such circumstances it is not uncommon for a lender to allow the borrower 
to miss a few payments or even forgive part of the loan. Udry (1994) found that state-contingent 
defaults were provided for in rural loan contracts in Nigeria. Agricultural contracts have always 
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taken this into consideration as is manifest from Hammurabi’s code (circa 1795 BC) which stated 
that: 
 
“If any one owes a debt for a loan, and a storm prostrates the grain, or the harvest fail, or the 
grain does not grow for lack of water; in that year he need not give his creditor any grain, he 
washes his debt-tablet in water and pays no rent for this year”. 
 
2.1.2.6 Reputation and Multi-period contracts 
Lambert (1983) and others studied what dimensions there are to the moral hazard problem in the 
event of a multi-period contract. In this scenario, because an agent is committed to a multi-period 
contract they know that their behaviour would impact their access to surplus in subsequent periods. 
The chances of future access are improved by building a good reputation which is like an earned 
privilege. The deterrent for morally hazardous actions is the opportunity that behaviour in the 
current period provides for building a reputation that would enhance future period incentives 
(Mishkin, 2009). Output contingent contracts are not necessarily easier to manage, as a farmer can 
decide to hide or inaccurately report his output. Even if it were possible to prevent this, the farmer 
could just simply decide to default. Enforcing contract obligations are difficult enough as it is in 
rural areas. This is why it is important for contracts to be self-enforcing, with built in incentives 
for desired behaviour (Conning and Udry, 2007). 
  
2.1.2.7 The use of Limited liability contracts, collateral and other incentives 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) pointed out the marked variance in the conditions of access to finance 
across households and the close link between financing terms and production activities. Within the 
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same region some farmers may be using commercial bank loans while others who grow the same 
crops and use the same distribution channels may be using much more expensive informal 
moneylenders. In a complete market every project that is socially profitable would be financed, 
without regards to the farmer’s asset base or activities performed on the farm. In reality, the 
conditions of access are often linked to the current asset holding and the anticipated crop activity 
because lenders need pledges and other guarantees to satisfy them that the level of risk is 
acceptable (Banerjee, 2003). The initial distribution of assets within the village can therefore have 
a significant impact on the quantity and variety of financial contracts and intermediaries. Consider 
moral hazard within the example of a single period contract with a risk-neutral farmer. If the 
contract is a fixed debt contract (FDC) meaning the farmer has to pay irrespective of the project 
outcome, this will make them a full residual claimant. This contract will not be practicable if the 
farmer is not happy to bear the full burden in some low outcome states, for instance where his 
output and residual assets are insufficient to meet the payment amount (Ledgerwood et al, 2013). 
An important incentive in such a contract then would be some form of limitation of liability in the 
event of adverse outcomes. 
 
2.1.2.8 Impact of land tenure on credit supply 
The limitation of liability is difficult to achieve in many rural financial markets because of poorly 
defined or contested property rights (Deininger, 2003). De Soto (2000) discussed the fact that 
billions of people in poor communities all over the world possess communal rights over real estate 
property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars but they lack the capability to leverage those 
assets on the capital markets because they do not have formal legal title to the assets. These assets 
constitute ‘dead capital’ for the poor people who are their owners as in spite of their ownership 
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they cannot benefit from the opportunities that integration and participation in the world’s capital 
and product markets could provide (Ibtissem and Bouri, 2013). On one hand, several studies done 
for India, Paraguay, Kenya and Burkina Faso found that tenure security had little effect on either 
investment demand or credit supply (Conning and Udry, 2007). However Field (2004) found that 
titling programs in Peru significantly increased loan approval rates from public (but not private) 
lenders while reducing the rates charged for these loans. 
 
2.2 Empirical review of literature 
The theoretical literature review above discussed various models developed in a bid to understand 
the development and operation of financial markets. This section now explores various field 
studies that have contributed to and often contradicted these models by analyzing financial markets 
in developing countries. 
 
2.2.1 Studies on credit markets in developing countries 
A significant number of analytical research studies have attempted to explain the way credit 
markets function by using new theoretical developments based on research in rural communities. 
These studies for the main part challenge the paradigm of competitive equilibrium, and explore 
the manner in which the realities of incomplete markets and imperfect information impact on how 
credit markets in developing markets function. These have led to the development of new 
theoretical underpinning for policy intervention. Most of this body of literature has largely 
followed from the seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981; Atieno, 2001; Ledgerwood et al, 
2013). The work by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is essentially regarded as the first of attempts to 
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explain the way credit markets perform credit rationing. They found that the interest rates a 
financial institution charges perform a dual role. They sort potential borrowers (leading to adverse 
selection), and also affect how borrowers act (leading to the incentive effect). Interest rates charged 
may not necessarily then be the price at which demand and supply for credit coincide, but do have 
an impact on the nature of the transaction (Atieno, 2001). 
 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) attributed this dual effect to the fact that imperfect information is an 
inherent feature of credit markets. The expected returns of the finance providers depends on the 
repayment of the credit extended so they seek borrowers who are most likely to honour their credit 
obligations. In this process, the lenders use the interest rate an individual is willing to pay as a 
screening device. This leads to adverse selection because those borrowers who are riskier may 
however be much more willing to pay high rates, so as the interest rate increases, the risk profile 
of the borrowers also worsens, impacting negatively on the lender’s profitability (Ibtissem and 
Bouri, 2013). Changes in the interest rate and other contract terms modify the behaviour of the 
borrowers as they respond to the impact these changes have on the returns to their projects, leading 
to an incentive effect. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that a problem of moral hazard arises as the 
rates increase because borrowers then go for projects with high potential returns even though they 
have much lower chances of succeeding, shifting the risk of failure to the lenders who fail to recoup 
the credit extended. The lenders are unable to control the actions of the borrowers due to imperfect 
information so they have to formulate the terms of the contract in such a manner that it would 
attract low risk borrowers and also motivate the borrowers to act in the lenders’ interests.  This 
leads to an equilibrium interest rate with credit demand exceeding supply. How much collateral is 
required and other contract terms like the amount of the loan also influence the way borrowers 
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behave and the returns the lenders receive (Atieno 2001; Meyer, 2015). Therefore, in situations of 
excess demand an increase in interest rates or collateral will not necessarily lead to more profits 
for the lenders and certain borrowers will inevitably be turned away (Ibtissem and Bouri, 2013). 
This leads to credit rationing in credit markets, a phenomenon where : (a) In spite of loan  
applicants appearing to be identical, some will not receive credit even if are willing to pay higher 
interest rates, and some receive credit even if they offer to pay lower rates. (b) At a given supply 
of credit there are identifiable groups who are unable to obtain credit at any interest rate, and would 
only obtain it if the supply increased (Atieno 2001). 
 
For potential loan applicants in rural areas in many parts of the developing world, the problem is 
even more complicated. In most cases, there is very little incentive for lenders to extend credit. 
This has changed over the years with the possibility of credit rationing, though the rationing tends 
to favour medium and large scale agricultural concerns over smallholders (Burgess and Pande, 
2003). Besley (1994), emphasises the need for interventions in rural credit markets due to the 
prevalence of market failure. Imperfect information makes contract enforcement extremely costly 
in credit markets. Therefore, defining market failure with reference to the efficiency measure that 
applies in a perfectly competitive market will be misleading. Besley (1994) found that these two 
issues of imperfect information and expensive contract enforcement result in credit rationing, 
adverse selection and moral hazard. There is adverse selection when the market lacks perfect 
information, as an increase in interest rates causes those borrowers with less risky projects to shy 
away from debt while those with more risky projects and hence poorer repayment prospects 
develop a higher appetite for debt. Interest rates thus have an impact on the average quality of the 
loan portfolios held by lenders as well as equating demand and supply for credit. Lenders set the 
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interest rates lower than the market equilibrium and proceed to ration access to credit. This credit 
rationing is largely due to imperfect information in rural credit markets (Besley, 1994). Moral 
hazard is a result of the fact that projects with identical mean returns will have different risk 
profiles, and lenders cannot reliably determine how borrowers will behave (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Besley, 1994; Ibtissem and Bouri, 2013). An increase in interest rates reduces the incentive 
of the borrowers to act in a manner that is conducive to loan repayment, leading to the possibility 
of credit rationing (Atieno, 2001). 
 
Bell (1990) also demonstrates a relationship between incomplete information, imperfect contract 
enforcement and the probability of loan default and eventual credit rationing. The conclusion of 
the study was that loan supply is simultaneously determined with the implicit credit demand 
function. By impacting transaction costs, risk plays a crucial role in credit allocation in incomplete 
credit markets (Ibtissem and Bouri, 2013). Accordingly, as risk exists by default in credit markets, 
with a supply curve that slopes upward, lenders will restrict borrowers to a number of points on 
the supply curve. The loan demand schedule cannot be identified using the observed loans since 
these loan amounts reflect only the existing supply. The borrower’s decision to participate in the 
credit market or not, meaning the decision of whether to borrow and from whom to borrow, 
depends among other things, on the opportunities available and their economic situation 
(Ledgerwood et al; 2013). The credit demand function is interpreted from the participation 
decision and this demand schedule identification setback therefore suggests the presence of credit 




Available empirical research on rural credit use suggests that it is difficult to judge the level of 
potential demand from revealed demand, and to determine whether it outweighs supply (Aryeetey, 
1996b). The limited supply due to credit rationing leads to a low revealed demand, suggesting a 
lack of demand. Market failures create a perception that transaction costs and inflexible contract 
terms in the credit market far exceed the utility, so rural households prefer to finance working 
capital with profits from their different activities and also use informal credit markets. Botswana’s 
credit markets are no different from the rest of the developing world, which is why the government 
made a decision to fund several schemes through the government owned DFIs like NDB and 
CEDA (MFDP 2010). Initiatives like the Temo Bokamoso Credit Scheme are supposed to solve 
the supply side issues, increasing available funds for development, especially in those sectors that 
would traditionally have difficulty in obtaining access to finance. Participation in these schemes 
however still falls far short of expected levels (NDB 2011). 
 
2.2.2 Studies on the characteristics of rural credit markets 
Rural credit markets in the developing world have a couple of additional features that make them 
rather unique as opposed to the urban financial markets (Conning and Udry, 2007). Understanding 
these features helps to clarify the context within which schemes like the Temo Bokamoso operate 
in a bid to service rural smallholders. 
 
2.2.2.1 Fragmented credit markets 
There is fragmentation in rural financial markets, as depending on the characteristics of the 
different lenders and borrowers, and the types of activities financed, borrowers are spread across 
diverse loan instruments and lending intermediaries [McKinnon (1973); Hoff, Braverman and 
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Stiglitz (1993); Meyer, (2015)]. Financial instruments in the same market vary substantially in 
nature and structure. Interest rates, the type and quantity of collateral, and resources invested on 
monitoring and enforcing contract terms differ widely from firm to firm (Conning and Udry, 
2007). Udry (1991) found large variations in the interest rates charged during a study in northern 
Nigeria: about 20% of the loans had interest rates that surpassed 7.5%. Ngugi (2001) found spreads 
in Kenya in the late 1990s ranging between 15% and 30%. Okurut (2011) found that the informal 
sector in Botswana charges monthly interest rates of 20% to 30%. 
 
In the rural economy there is a wide range of financial intermediaries and moneylenders which 
include input suppliers, rural product traders, and banks (Conning and Udry, 2007). The following 
observation was made by Sir Malcolm Darling (1925) about the rural moneylender of Punjab: 
“He is always accessible, even at night; dispenses with troublesome formalities, asks no 
inconvenient questions, advances promptly, and if interest is paid, does not press for 
repayment of principal. He keeps in close personal touch with his clients, and in many 
villages shares their occasions of weal or woe. With his intimate knowledge of those around 
him he is able, without serious risk, to finance those who would otherwise get no loan at all.” 
 
A common form of intermediated finance in rural financial markets is contract farming. A contract 
farming firm would enter an agreement with a farmer to market of process his harvest and would 
provide the farmer with farm inputs or credit in exchange. The collateral for the loan would usually 
just be the expected harvest, which would be pledged. The contract farming firm would have to 
invest significant resources in monitoring the farm during the growing season to prevent the farmer 
from diverting resources towards other activities the lender may not have claims to. Mechanisms 
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exist to motivate the farmer to act in the lender’s best interest, like lending only a fraction of the 
expected value of the crop (Conning and Udry, 2007). The Botswana Agricultural Marketing 
Board (BAMB) provides contract farming services to farmers. BAMB identifies markets for 
particular crops and then contracts farmers to produce them at agreed prices and quantities prior 
to planting (MOA, 2015). The farmers can then use this off-take agreement from BAMB as 
collateral to participate in the Temo Bokamoso or any other scheme provided by one of the other 
government owned DFIs. This facilitates access to finance for rural smallholders in Botswana yet 
the rural markets have been observed to have low participation and be significantly fragmented, 
with the majority of farmers not taking up the opportunities on offer (Okurut et al, 2009). 
 
2.2.2.2 Government interventions in rural credit markets 
Government intervention has been a customary feature of rural financial markets for as long as 
they have existed. When Hammurabi, ruler of Babylon and ancient Mesopotamia developed one 
of the earliest codes of law between 1792-1750 B.C, he included many laws intended to regulate 
the provision of credit to farmers by merchants. One law capped the interest rate on loans of grain 
to thirty three and one third percent. Other regulations limited borrowers’ liability on agricultural 
debts if they lost their harvest due to drought or other natural disasters (Goetzmann, 1996). When 
government provides strong impartial legal institutions and mechanisms, contract enforcement and 
other transaction costs are significantly reduced (Porter et al, 2015). Governments in many 
developing countries also cap interest rates or strengthen and monitor requirements for financial 
intermediation in order to discourage the practice of usury (Conning and Udry, 2007). 
Governments have for decades been attempting to stimulate the development of private sector 
financial intermediation by providing guarantees and loans. The state is still the dominant provider 
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of institutional finance in most developing countries, and this is particularly evident in Botswana 
though access varies widely between the regions (BOB 2014). 
 
The World Bank’s 1975 Report on agricultural credit found that subsidized lending was available 
to under 1% of those involved in agriculture in Africa obtained access to subsidized lending. The 
main reason for the lack of effective intermediation in many developing countries is that 
government’s participation in microfinance often has the effect of crowding out private investment 
(Conning and Udry, 2007). Although well-intentioned, many government policies intended to 
develop rural economies tend to discourage private financial intermediaries from entering the 
sector. Microfinance programmes funded by the state also have a problem of being subverted in 
order to achieve political aims (Deininger, 2003). During the 80s and 90s, it was found that loans 
by government funded DFIs in India to rural farmers grew by more than 10 percentage points in 
election years, with districts where the elections were heavily contested benefitting most, 
regardless of the potential for productivity or repayment (Cole, 2004). In the 1980s, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) assisted 37 African countries to implement structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) due to the failure of policies that included state intervention 
schemes in rural financial markets (Noorbakhsh, 1999). The World Bank reduced annual lending 
for agricultural projects from US$ 1 billion to under $250 million in the 1990s (Zeller, 2003). As 
part of the SAPs, many state owned enterprises were privatized, many state banks were either 
closed or restructured and rural financial markets were liberalised. These reforms led to new 
financial intermediaries. Developing country governments are now faced with a major challenge 
of regulating, supporting and promoting these new rural institutions (Conning and Udry, 2007). 
The evolution of the institutions that might support a flourishing rural financial sector must be 
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viewed in the context of incomplete information and imperfect contract enforcement (IFAD, 
2011). Botswana ranks highly in most indexes which measure governance and the ease of doing 
business and contract enforcement like the 2014 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) 
Index and Bank of Botswana’s 2014 report acknowledges the wide extent of government 
intervention in the rural credit markets through various DFIs like NDB. 
 
2.3 Microfinance and welfare in theory  
Christen (1997) defines microfinance as 'the means of providing a variety of financial services to 
the poor based on market-driven and commercial approaches'. This definition considers all 
possible financial services provided to the poor like savings, credit, money transfers,  remittances, 
insurance and so on, suggesting that is it not the size of the service but the economic class of the 
client that makes it microfinance (Kiiru, 2007; Ledgerwood et al, 2013). Microfinance institutions 
however mainly focus on the provision of small loans (microcredit) to the poor with the objective 
of smoothing consumption or financing initiatives to improve their income producing capability 
and general household welfare (Diagne et al 2001). There is a consensus in development 
policymaking circles that microfinance is an important tool for reducing poverty, so concerted 
efforts are being made to ensure access to microfinance is provided in a sustainable manner and 
the poor are encouraged to participate (Okurut et al, 2012). This has been met with skepticism in 
many quarters as some are of the opinion that microfinance has no impact on poverty alleviation. 
Adam & Von Pische (1992), argued that “debt is not an effective tool for helping most poor people 
to enhance their economic condition be they operators of small farms or micro entrepreneurs”. 
Their contention is that smallholder farmers have more important problems facing them like access 
to markets for their produce, land tenure, access to farming technology and product prices. Gulli 
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(1998) claimed that addressing more pressing constraints like social services and business 
development tools and training would be more effective in reducing poverty (Meyer, 2015). 
Mayoux (2002) in a study on access to finance for rural women found that instead of empowering 
the women, microfinance left them highly indebted with little to show for it due to the fact that 
they had little control over the funds allocated to them because of the structure of gender relations 
in their communities (Mayoux 2002; Pooter et al, 2015). The literature on microfinance impact in 
Botswana is very scant and this study should make a relevant contribution to it.  
 
2.4 Empirical review of Microfinance impact on welfare 
Measures of prosperity such as social participation, economic participation and wellbeing are an 
important way to measure the impact of microfinance and other socially responsible financial 
programs Corrie 2011). ‘Impact’ is the incremental result due to an intervention, while ‘welfare’ 
is the well-being of the subject of the intervention (Bauchet et al., 2011). Hulme (2000) argued 
that impact assessment is best determined from the perspective of an individual, household, 
enterprise or community level. Okurut et al (2012) demonstrated that the reason studies on impact 
produced such divergent results was due to different methodologies, impact metrics and failure to 
control sampling bias. Duvendack et al (2011) suggested that the main limitations of studies on 
impact of microfinance is data inadequacy and Kabeer (2001) in a discussion of impact studies on 
women empowerment found that divergent results were due to a poor understanding of power 
relations in the sampled households. Hulme and Mosley (1997)’s study in seven countries in Africa 
and Asia, reported a significant positive effect on house hold welfare. Okurut et al (2013) also 
reported a significant positive impact on gender empowerment in Botswana. Binswanger and 
Khandker (1995) found that access to credit enabled rural households to smooth their consumption 
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during leaner periods of the year. Multiple studies on the Grameen Bank hailed the bank as 
promoting the empowerment of the poor, especially women (Hossain 1988). The Bangladesh 
Institute of Development Studies also conducted joint studies with the World Bank which 
established causal relationships between access to micro-finance and poverty alleviation in 
Bangladesh (Pitt and Khandker 1998). These studies also found that micro-finance schemes 
improved the healthcare of the participants and led to other social benefits like education for the 
children as households invested the incremental incomes in other aspects of their wellbeing. A 
study by Johanna (2013) on the impact that microfinance has on the empowerment of rural women 
in Burma found a significantly positive impact at the one percent significance level. Chowdhury 
et al. (1991), noted that their treatment group of women had acquired more assets and earned more 
income than the group of nonparticipants in the microfinance scheme in Bangladesh. Coping 
mechanisms developed by the participants to manage lean periods were also more effective than 
those of the nonparticipants in the Chowdury et al (1991) study. 
 
Several studies in the developing world have posted contrary findings on the impact of 
microfinance on rural welfare. Okurut and Bategeka (2006), did not find a significantly positive 
effect on households sampled in Ugandan villages.  Coleman (1999), performed a nationwide 
survey in Thailand and reported that the female respondents in the study had not experienced a 
significant improvement in their asset holdings or incomes. The finance provided to these women 
had ended up being consumed to meet day to day expenses, leaving the women in a vicious cycle 
of debt as they had to turn to moneylenders who charged exorbitant rates in order to settle the 
initial credit. The village bank loan scheme had then collapsed. Coleman (1999) thus concluded 
that microfinance is not an effective tool for transforming the wellbeing of the rural poor. Diagne 
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and Zeller (2001) were also notable critics of the use of microfinance for poverty alleviation as 
their study found its effect to be counterproductive. Burger (1989) observed that the income of the 
participants did not increase and no new jobs were created. Access to microfinance left the 
community right where it had started off. Goetz and Gupta (1994) found that a microfinance 
scheme targeted at women failed to empower them because of the balance of gender power in the 
community. While the women went out and took the loan commitments, the funds disbursed were 
then turned over to their husbands for investment decision making. The women were then saddled 
with the responsibility of repaying the loan obligations and suffered domestic violence if they tried 
to turn over this responsibility to the men who had squandered the funds. Montgomery (1996) and 
Ackerly (1995) echoed the same views about women having little control over their loans and 
having to work additional jobs in order to pay them off. Banerjee et al (2013), did not find 
significant differences in consumption expenditure or in the profitability of financed ventures 
between the treatment and control groups in India. They concluded that the microfinance scheme 
had not had the desired effect.  
 
It is clear from the above empirical review that the evidence currently available on the impact of 
microfinance on the welfare of those rural poor who have access to it is very mixed. However, 
there is very little empirical work that has been conducted within the socio-economic context of 
Botswana and hopefully this study will make a contribution and provide some insight on the impact 




2.5 Botswana’s financial sector 
The Central bank, Bank of Botswana (BOB), is the regulator of the banking industry in the country. 
It has regulatory authority over the commercial banks, bureau de changes, deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions as well as statutory banks (BOB, 2015). According to Bank of 
Botswana’s Annual Supervision Annual Report 2014, the industry is one of the fastest growing in 
the country, accounting for about 8% of GDP. There are 11 commercial banks which dominate the 
industry with total assets and liabilities at the end of 2014 of about 48% of GDP (BOB, 2015). 
Besides the commercial banks, there is a merchant bank and a number of government-owned 
financial institutions, including Botswana Savings Bank (BSB), the National Development Bank 
(NDB), CEDA, and the Botswana Development Corporation (BDC) (eConsult, 2015). These 
control 10% of the banking industry assets and liabilities as opposed to 90% for the commercial 
banks (BOB, 2015). There is also the partially government owned Botswana Building Society 
(BBS). Private micro lending companies like Letshego, Penrich, First Funding, and Peo (which 
are quite large), and a large number of small, informal entities (“cash loans”) dominate the 
microfinance space, with competition from a number of unlicensed credit unions, savings and 
loans societies (metshelo) and burial societies. Since they do not take deposits, they are not subject 
to banking regulation so it is difficult to obtain information on their activities (eConsult, 2015). 
Most of these microfinance institutions however focus their activities in the urban areas where 
they provide payday loans and other forms of credit to small businesses and entrepreneurs. 
Penetration in the rural areas is 25% lower than the average for African countries (BOB 2015).  
 
The BDC deals with commercial loans starting at P30 million (USD3 million) to large-scale 
enterprises; CEDA provides long term finance to citizen owned entrepreneurial ventures as its 
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mandate is to develop local entrepreneurship; BBS provides mortgage finance to commercial 
entities and full time employees. Credit unions and metshelo provide small-scale savings facility, 
and burial societies provide savings and insurance services, though the interest rates are not 
attractive (eConsult, 2015). There are two schemes available for smallholder farmers, the NDB’s 
Temo Bokamoso Scheme and CEDA’s Young Farmers’ Fund. 
 
The banking industry in Botswana is extremely profitable, due to its oligopolistic nature leading 
to high banking charges and access issues. The return of equity enjoyed by the industry is over 
20% (BOB, 2015). This is in keeping with the rest of the African continent where returns on assets 
and equity are generally high by world standards (eConsult, 2015). The high returns cannot be 
explained by the level of risk, as BOB (2015) reports that the default rates are low and the industry 
performs better than most countries in credit and other financial risk assessments. It is thus clear 
that the level of competition is inadequate. The population may be small but it is quite a prosperous 
country and the high profitability and lack of competition may be the reason why lenders do not 
bother to penetrate the market for credit to rural smallholders, forcing the government to step in 
with schemes like the Temo Bokamoso.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Papias and Ganesan (2010) identified three main forms of credit constraints which prevailed 
among the majority of the rural households they studied. The first one was quantity rationing, with 
finance houses limiting the amount of credit they were willing to extend; the second was risk 
rationing, with financial institutions reluctant to accept the risk of financing certain activities; and 
the third being self-imposed constraints, as smallholder farmers often chose to self-select 
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themselves out of formal financial markets due to factors intrinsic either to their households or to 
their farms.  (Baydas et al. 1994; Binswanger et al. 1989; Diagne 1999; Diagne et al. 2001; Fuentes 
1996; Hashemi et al. 1997; Kiiza and Pederson 2001; Oboh and Kushwaha 2009; Okurut et al, 
2013; Muhongayire et al, 2013). It is thus pertinent to determine what specific institutional, socio-
economic and activity factors determine participation in micro finance schemes in Botswana. 
While multiple studies have investigated the determinants of participation in microfinance for rural 
populations (Alexander-Tedeschi and Karlan. 2006; Heckman, J. and J. Smith. 2004), they have 
mostly focused on gender empowerment and none have been conducted on any specific credit 
lender to smallholder farmers in Botswana specifically. Identifying the factors that affect 
participation in credit schemes in Botswana would provide valuable insights for rural development 
policy makers and other stakeholders. In conclusion, empirical evidence on the determinants and 
impact of microfinance on the welfare of the beneficiaries in the studies reviewed is at best mixed, 













CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provides the foundation upon which the determinants of credit use by 
smallholder farmers can be identified. This chapter identifies some key variables that affect the 
probability of participation in the Temo Bokamoso credit scheme in Kweneng District of Botswana 
by allowing the formulation of an econometric model for this study. The first section discusses the 
conceptual framework from which variables to be used in the model will be identified. This is 
followed by an outline of the methodology for data collection, sample design and sample 
techniques that have been employed in the study. The last sections specify the econometric model 
that have been adopted and conclude the chapter.   
 
3.2. The Conceptual Framework 
3.2.1. Socio-Economic Features of the Farmer and Credit Participation 
Over the last 40 years agriculture in Africa has evolved significant, moving slowly away from 
being a subsistence industry to a viable industry with high returns, which is the backbone of many 
African economies. The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) released a 2014 Africa 
Agriculture Status Report which noted that smallholder farmers account for 80% of the agricultural 
activity in Sub-Saharan Africa, employing about 175 million people. With environmental issues 
like climate change and increasing competitiveness fast gaining prominence, increasing returns in 
agriculture is dependent on farmers’ abilities and skills, adoption of new technologies and access 
to credit markets (Arene 1992; Njoku and Odii 1991). The impact of gender on access to and 
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participation in rural finance cannot be ignored as women make up 70% of smallholders (AGRA, 
2014). Baydas et al. (1994) found evidence of discrimination against women in formal financial 
markets, a view echoed by several other researchers. Buvinic et al. (1979) identified lack of control 
over their economic resources and the nature of the activity women engage in (mostly farming), 
as major factors hindering their access to formal credit compared to men. Mohamed (2003) in 
gathered empirical evidence in Zanzibar that supports these assertions. 
 
Age is another factor that can have a significant impact on farmers’ ability to access financial 
markets. Older people are likely to have more farming experience and have had more time to 
acquire collateral, factors which increase the trust and confidence of lenders but also lessen their 
reliance on credit (Feder et al. 1988). On the other hand, younger farmers may not have much of 
a track record to demonstrate their farming competence, or significant assets to use as collateral, 
but need credit to be able to adopt new technologies and maximise their farming output (Nguyen 
2003). This leads to a paradox in rural credit markets wherein older people who are considered 
more creditworthy participate less, due to being more risk averse and having less need for credit, 
while younger farmers who rely on credit for their survival and growth are discriminated against. 
In Pakistan, Shah et al. (2008) found that participation in credit was significantly influenced by 
the age of the borrowing household head. 
 
Feder et al. (1988), concluded that education is an asset which improves not only the farmer’s 
efficiency, but also their understanding of credit markets, increasing the likelihood of participation. 
As a rural household acquires more formal education, their improved financial management skills 
and exposure to information on how to improve their operational efficiency helps to secure access 
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to finance (Musebe et al. 1993). A study in rural Kenya by Musyimi (2010) on the determinants 
of credit market participation found that the majority of farmers did not participate due to 
ignorance on the modalities of accessing and managing credit. Studies in China, Pakistan, Uganda 
and Zanzibar all found a strong positive correlation between the level of education achieved by the 
farmer and the probability of participating on a credit scheme (Kiiza and Pederson, 2001; 
Mohamed, 2003; Shah et al., 2008; Tang et al., 2010. The size of the household is indicative of 
the amount of labour available for economic endeavours.  A household with a sizable labour force 
is likely to be a lower credit risk since the burden of productivity is spread over a larger number 
of people (Schereiner and Nagarajan 1997). Empirical evidence has been documented in China, 
Pakistan and notably in Ethiopia on the impact of the household size on rural participation in credit 
schemes (Tang et al. 2010, Shah et al. 2008, Sisay, 2008). 
 
Income from non-farming activities is another important determinant of credit market 
participation. However its effect can either be positive or negative depending on the circumstances. 
Off-farm income sources can be used as collateral and the incomes can also help to finance 
repayments, so it reduces the risk profile of the borrower and provides reassurance to the lender 
(Sharma and Zeller 1997). Diagne (1999), found that having income from non-farming activities 
improves a farmer’s access to credit. On the other hand, income from non-farming activities has 
also been found to reduce the level of participation in credit schemes as it enables households to 
finance their activities without having to resort to debt. Studies in Uganda, Nigeria and China 
found that households with incomes from sources other than farming had a higher probability of 
participating in microfinance schemes (Kiiza and Pederson, 2001; Oboh and Kushwaha, 2009; 




3.2.2. Farm Characteristics and Credit Market Participation 
Agricultural land is usually the most valuable asset of the rural farmer, and the main collateral for 
credit (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986). Farmers with bigger landholdings are also more likely 
to participate in the credit market as capital would be required to fully exploit the land. The size 
of the landholding is thus expected to have a positive correlation with the likelihood of 
participation in credit. Oboh and Kushwaha (2009) in Nigeria, and Tang et al. (2010) in China 
obtained empirical evidence that credit demand is significantly influenced certain farm features 
like the size of the farm, availability of irrigation and the type of farming activity carried out. 
 
3.2.3. Institutional Characteristics 
The role that local institutions have to play in farmers’ access to financial markets has been 
highlighted by several studies. The levels of penetration of financial institutions in a rural area 
would have an impact on the ability of the local population to participate in formal credit. Kiiza 
and Pederson (2001) in Uganda, Oboh and Kushwaha (2009) in Nigeria, and Shah et al. (2008) in 
Pakistan and Sisay (2008) all found that physical proximity to credit providers is a significant 
factor in a rural household’s decision to participate in credit programmes.  
 
3.3 Study area  
Kweneng is the homeland of the Bakwena tribe and one of the 11 administrative districts of the 
Republic of Botswana. The Bakwena derive their name from their totem, the crocodile (kwena), 
and the district is home to the Kobokwe Caves in which legend says Bakwena Kings used to throw 
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in witches before their conversion to Christianity by famed missionary David Livingstone. It is a 
semi-arid region like most of Botswana and has various historical landmarks. The seat of the 
district's government is Molepolole, Botswana's most populous village and the district is strongly 
affected by rural-urban migration because of its proximity to Gaborone. There are 6 villages in the 
district with a total population of 176,373 as per the last census in 2011. It is a fully rural district 
as there are no towns, one of the features that make it very suitable for this study.  
 





Source: Statistics Botswana 
Source: Statistics Botswana 2011 census 
 
3.3.1. Economy of Kweneng district 
The main economic activity in the villages of Kweneng district is agriculture. The two biggest 
villages are mostly inhabited by people who work in the national capital, Gaborone, as they are 
very close to the capital and the city has been expanding in that direction. About 90% of the 
population of the other villages is engaged in mixed farming and the rest 10% is engaged in petty 
trading, hospitality industry, government officials, daily labourers, artisans etc. The farming 
practices in the district can be characterized as mixed, and includes the production of arable crops 
and raising of livestock, including cattle, goats, chicken and small ruminants. The output of both 
sectors has been depressed for a number of years due to an extended drought and erratic rainfall.  
 
Village Population 








Gabane 10,399 13,581 14,842 







3.4 Research Design 
The study adopted a descriptive survey design, with the intention of depicting the participants in 
the most accurate way possible. The descriptive survey design makes it possible to narrow down 
the research problem and investigate it with precision (Wilkinson and Bhandarkar, 1986; Kothari, 
2006). The use of a survey was appropriate because it enabled the identification of patterns that 
applied generally to the sample as indicated by Saunders et al, (2009). Consequently, results of the 
study go a long way towards explaining to what extent participation in the Temo Bokamoso Credit 
Scheme in Kweneng district is influenced by certain internal and external factors. The research 
design also provided a built-in flexibility that transformed the research problem to one with more 
precise meaning.  
 
3.5. Sampling Procedure and Data Collection 
The study used a multistage sampling procedure to select farm households. Kweneng district was 
selected purposely out of the total 11 districts of Botswana based on its high agro-ecological 
potential. The district is also largely rural, but due to a higher population density than the other 
rural districts, the farming activity is mainly carried on by smallholder farmers (Statistics 
Botswana 2014). Its closeness to Gaborone where the researcher is based was also a factor due to 
cost considerations. From its six villages, Thamaga, Gabane, Kopong and Letlhakeng were 
purposefully selected based on their largely rural character and the high participation in formal 
credit, made possible by the closeness to Gaborone where NDB and the other finance houses are 
based. One ward was then randomly selected in each of these identified villages. The Headmen 
for these wards assisted with a list of the resident households and that amounted to the sample 
frame. Furthermore, a list of the clients who participated in the Temo-Bokamoso project and who 
39 
 
are resident in the selected wards was then obtained from NDB. This constituted the treatment 
group whereas the non-clients acted as the control group.  
 
The NDB list provided up to 56 households from the chosen wards that participated in the scheme. 
A structured questionnaire was prepared to collect data for the study using face-to-face interviews. 
A pilot test of the survey instrument was conducted, which allowed the researcher to adjust the 
forms and flows of questions. Afterwards, face to face interviews were performed with the 56 
credit scheme participants and 56 non participants. Only the household heads were allowed to 
participate in the interviews. 
 
3.6. Econometric model: logistic regression 
An econometric approach was employed to assess the factors that determine rural farmers’ 
participation in the microfinance scheme. However, a statistical analysis was utilized to assess the 
impact on their welfare. In the econometric approach, the independent variables are denoted as 
dummy and then multiple regression analysis is carried out. Linear regression is significantly more 
complex when the dependent variable is binary (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). A binary model 
assumes survey participants have two mutually exclusive options, for instance, to participate or 
not to participate in a credit scheme. Descriptive statistics were employed to discuss the sample, 
using measures of central tendency like mean, median and mode and measures of dispersion like 
the standard deviation, variance and skewness. The results were also summarized using ratios, 
percentages, and tables. The determinants of participation in the TBCS were then identified with 
the help of a logistic distribution (logit) model and a logistic regression showed the functional 




Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989), demonstrated the superiority of the logit model over others. They 
showed that from a mathematical perspective its use easier, and more meaningful results are 
produced when it is used to analyse dichotomous variables. This is very relevant as this study set 
out to analyse which of the independent variables influence the dependent variable, and the 
strength and nature of this influence. Some of the independent variables are dummy while others 
are continuous. The dependent variables on the other hand are dummy and take a value of zero or 
one based on whether or not a farmer participates in the Temo Bokamoso Credit Scheme and their 
participation has led to an improvement in their welfare. According to Gujarati (1995), the types 
of models most commonly used to evaluate the factors that determine micro-finance participation 
are logit and probability + unit (probit) models, when dealing with a limited number of dependent 
variables. When doing a regression using a probit model, the dependent variable can also only take 
one of two values, for instance, married or not married. The probit model produces results that are 
very similar to those of a regression performed with a logit model. However, the logit model is 
easier to estimate and the results are easier to interpret, leading to it being more widely used in 
such studies (Green, 2011). This study employed the binary logit model for these reasons. 
 
3.7. Model specification 
 The logit model employed for studying the determinants of participation in the Temo Bokamoso 
Credit Scheme in Kweneng district and its impact on the welfare of participants can be specified 
based on the contributions of Green (2011) and Gujarati (1995). The explanatory variables 
included dummy and continuous variables as outlined below, while the dependent variable a 
dummy variable, taking a value 0 or 1 based on whether or not an individual is participating, and 
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whether the participation has an effect on their income. Logistic regression does not assume a 
linear relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables, but requires that the 
independent variables be linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable (Green, 2011). 
Pundo and Fraser (2006) explained that the model allows for the interpretation of the logit weights 
for the variables in the same way as in linear regression. Accordingly, consistent estimation is 
possible by conditional maximum likelihood, such that the standard logistic distribution is 




Where, P(Participationi) is probability of participation of individual i. The right hand side 
indicates a set of the independent variables all summarized in Table 3.2. 
 
There are many discrete choice models that exist and many have been applied to different 
economic problems (McFadden, 1981; Baltag, 2005; Green, 2011). The logistic model is counted 
amongst the best, as it is simple, easily estimated and interpreted. It provides cross elasticities and 
the software packages applicable to this model are readily available. The package used in this study 
is Home-Stata version 11. Despite all its merits, a logistic distribution has a problem which is the 
well-known one of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA); which assumes that the utility of 
choice option is independent of the attributes of other alternatives of the choice. This has led to the 
development of other models like the probit model which is free from this problem but is 
























3.8 Definitions of variables  
3.8.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable for the regression analysis represents the observed status of the respondent 
with regards to participation in the TBCS. In the logit model it takes a value of 1 for participant 
and 0 for non-participant as it is binary in nature.  
 
3.8.2 Independent variables 
Based on the conceptual framework for the study explained in section 3.1 above, these are a 
number of demographic and socio economic variables that are hypothesized to influence whether 
a respondent participates in the microfinance programme. These factors are grouped into three 
main categories namely the farmer’s socio-economic background, the farm characteristics and 





























Discussions in this chapter focused on the research methodology adopted for the study. A logit 
econometric model has been specified and the variables for which data was collected also 
discussed. Also, the chapter has shown that the research is mainly based on primary data collected 
by administering questionnaires to the chosen respondents. The research design and sampling 
techniques used in the research were elucidated. The following chapter reports the results that were 
obtained from the econometric model. A complete analysis of the reported results then follows.   
  
 
No. Variables Variable 
type 




 MF Participation Dummy PART 1=if participated, 0=Did not participate 
Explanatory variables 
Farmer characteristics 
1 Age of the respondent Continuous  Age Age of the farmer in Years 
2 Gender of the household head Dummy Hhhead 1=female. 0=otherwise 
3 Respondents level of 
education 
Continuous Educ 1= Never went to school, 2= attended primary school, 3= 
junior secondary school, 4= senior secondary school, 
5=tertiary education institution. 
4 Number of dependents Continuous Ned Number of people whose age is below 14 and above 64 
5 Previous credit use-experience Dummy Pexcr experience=1,0= no experience 
6 Household size Continuous Hhsize Number of people living in the household (sharing food and 
shelter) 
7 Respondents perception of 
group collateral 
dummy Rpgc 1=appropriate,0=not appropriate 
8 Annual income from non-
farming activities 
Dummy AINF 1 = the head of household earns incomes from outside the 
farm; 0= otherwise 
Farm Characteristics 
9 Size of Total landholding Continuous TLH The total size of farmer’s landholding in acres 
10 Farm records keeping Dummy FRC 1 = the farmer keeps records of his farming activities; 
0=Otherwise 
11 Value of available assets Continuous VAC Value of assets in pula 
12 Access to irrigation Dummy IRRIG 1=have access,0= no access 
Institutional Factors 
13 Access to other sources of 
credit besides TBSC 
Dummy ScoTBSC 1=yes, 0=no 
14 Distance from microfinance 
institution 




CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
The results of the study will be discussed in this section, with an analysis of each of the research 
objectives using descriptive statistics and the econometric regression model output. The Logit 
model is used to analyse the factors determining participation in the TBCS in Kweneng district 
while the demographic characteristics of respondents is analysed with descriptive statistics. 
4.2. Socio demographic characteristics of respondents 
4.2.1 Respondent Age  
One hundred and twelve (112) respondents, fifty-six (56) participants and fifty-six (56) non-
participants, were interviewed. The age range was 26 to 64 years. The (31 to 40) age group had 
the highest frequency with twenty-four percent (24%) of participants and nineteen percent (19%) 
of nonparticipants, followed by (41 to 50) with twelve percent (12%) of both groups as seen from 
table 4.1 below, which shows a positively skewed distribution. Fifteen percent (15%) of 
participants were over fifty (50), compared to only seven (7) percent of nonparticipants.  
 







Age group Participant (%) Non –participant (%) Total (%) 
20-30  3.6 8.0 11.6 
31-40 24.1 18.8 42.9 
41-50 11.6 11.6 23.2 
51-60 11.6 7.1 18.7 
60 and above 3.6 0 3.6 




4.2.2 Educational status of the respondents 
Several studies, notably Khandker (1998) had found a strong positive relationship between the 
level of education and participation in microfinance so the results were expected to support this 
relationship. However it was found that both the control and the treatment group were significantly 
well educated. With respect to educational level of household heads, the majority of household 
heads (74 %) had tertiary education followed by junior secondary certificate (13%). Among the 
microfinance clients, the majority of household heads had tertiary education (39%), followed by 
junior secondary education (9 %). For the non-clients, the majority of household heads had attained 
tertiary qualification (35 %) followed by junior secondary level (20 %). In conclusion, the results 
suggest that there was high prevalence for tertiary and junior secondary qualifications amongst the 
household heads for both microfinance clients and non-clients. This high rural literacy rate is due 
to the Botswana government financing education up to tertiary level for citizens (DTEF, 2015). 
 








 Microfinance Status  





Primary  0 0.9 0.9 
Junior secondary  8.9 19.6 28.5 
Senior secondary  5.4 2.7 8.1 
Tertiary  39.3 34.8 74.1 




4.3 Respondents socio-economic characteristics and farm characteristic 
4.3.1 Total land holding of respondents 
Land is a key asset and source of income in Kweneng district. Participants were found to hold on 
average eight (8) hectares of land while for nonparticipants the average was five (5) hectares. The 
respondents land holding ranged from a minimum of two (2) to a maximum of ten (10) hectares. 
The survey purposefully targeted smallholders with farms of less than 10 hectares. Participants 
have on average, an area of land three (3) hectares larger than that held by non-participants, 
suggesting they could have a higher need for finance or just better collateral.  
 
4.3.2 Cash value of respondents’ livestock  
From a socio cultural perspective, livestock is the most significant measure of wealth and prestige 
to the Bakwena community. Ownership of a herd of cattle is even more important that land 
ownership. The smallholders of Kweneng district practice mixed farming and all respondents 
admitted to rearing livestock, including cattle, goats, poultry, donkeys and small ruminants. The 
current market value of participants’ livestock was estimated at thirty six thousand, three hundred 
and forty five (36345) pula while for non-participants it is twenty eight thousand four hundred and 
seventy three (28473) pula. On getting the loan, participants often acquire livestock to utilize the 
farm area they are not yet ready to plough in order to generate income from breeding and selling. 
 
4.3.3 Cash value of respondents’ other assets 
Other assets held by respondents other than the farm and livestock are potentially collateral for the 
loan taken from the TBCS. The assets considered here included items like vehicles, farm 
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equipment, furniture and fittings. On average participants reported assets of twenty nine thousand 
three hundred and twenty three (29343) pula against twenty eight thousand two hundred and fifty 
seven (28257) pula for non-participants. While the asset values of participants is higher than that 
of nonparticipants, the difference does not seem significant enough to indicate that it is a factor in 
the likelihood of participation in the NDB’s Temo Bokamoso Credit Scheme for Kweneng 
farmers. The asset values for respondents in the study ranged from four thousand (4000) to three 
hundred and seventy eight thousand, two hundred and fifty (378250) pula.  
 
4.3.4 Respondents number of dependents 
The participants in the Temo Bokamoso Credit Scheme reported having an average of six (6) 
dependents in their households while nonparticipants have an average of five (5). Dependents are 
defined as household members whose ages are below 14 or above 64. The mean difference between 
the two groups is (1.08). The higher level of responsibility due to dependents could possibly be a 
factor influencing participation in the credit scheme. 
 
4.3.5 Distance from microfinance institutions 
The mean distance from their farms to NDB’s nearest branch in Gaborone is forty one (41) km for 
participants and fifty four (54) km for non-participants. The minimum distance was noted to be 
ten (10) km while the maximum distance from the residence of respondents is seventy (70) km. 
The results indicate that respondents who are closer to the institution are more likely to participate 
in the credit scheme. It is worthy of note that NDB has four branches in Gaborone, Francistown, 













From the survey results in Table 4.4 below, seventeen percent (17%) of the participants and thirty-
three percent (33%) of the nonparticipants are female heads of households. Forty-three percent 
(43%) of all participants and fifty-three percent (53%) of non-participants have borrowed from 
sources of credit other than TBCS. This indicates significant access to other sources of credit 
including ROSCAs, moneylenders, friends and relatives. Several studies including Maghir (1991) 
and Sisay (2008) strongly advocate the delivery of financial services through formal regulated 
institutions as a poverty alleviation measure. This is argued to be especially beneficial to rural 
women as they then do not need to borrow from informal money lenders with high interest rates. 
Prior experience of credit use improves participation due to the familiarity with the benefits and 
the rules and regulations. Table 4.4 below indicates that fifty five percent (55%) of respondents 
have prior experience. Thirty eight percent (38%) of participants have prior experience with credit 
use while only eighteen percent (18%) of non-participants do. Previous participation in credit 
therefore is likely to increase the probability of participating in the TBCS.  
 
 
Variables Participants Non-Participants Total Min  Max 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean  Std Dev 
Farmer characteristic         
Age of the respondent 45.75 9.848396 38 7.476022 41.85714 9.520823 26 64 
Respondents’ level of education 4.535714 0.785419 4.660714 0.720525 4.598214 0.75289 2 5 
Number of dependents 5.964286 1.788491 4.875 2.320364 5.419643 2.133552 1 12 
Farm Characteristics 
Size of Total landholding 8.196429 1.901384 5.089286 1.729706 6.723214 2.39071 2 11 
Value of available assets 29343.21 16370.55 28257.43 32458.86 28955.88 23693.24 4000 378250 
Institutional Factors 
















Improving rural welfare is vital for reducing urban migration and reducing poverty in general. It 
is also important for empowering women, who play a vital role in the Kweneng rural economy.  
 
4.3.6 Income from non-farming activities 
About ninety one (91%) of the TBCS participants reported that they had alternative sources of 
income besides their agricultural activities. Table 4.5 indicates that nine percent (9%) of 
participants and twenty nine percent (29%) of nonparticipants earn below five thousand (5000) 
pula. At the other end of the table, while thirteen percent (13%) of participants earn over twenty 
five thousand (25000) pula, there are no nonparticipants in this income group. Farmers are aware 
that having an alternative source of income improves lender confidence so it motivates them to 
seek credit. 
 
Variable Participant (%) Non-participant (%) Chi2 Total (%) 
Farmer characteristics 
Gender of the household head                                      0.3564 
Otherwise 33.04 16.96  50 
Female 16.96 33.04  50 
Previous experience of credit use                              1.1706 
No 14.29 30.36  44.65 
Yes 37.5 17.85  55.35 
Respondents perception of group collateral                        51.65 
Appropriate 28.57 1.79  30.36 
Not appropriate 21.43 48.21  69.64 
Farm Characteristics 
Access to irrigation                                                    1.94 
No 77 69.38  71.84 
Yes 23 30.62  28.16 
Institutional Factors 
Access to other sources of credit besides TBSC              2.6868 
No 47 56.94  53.72 











4.3.7 Pattern of overall income- a welfare analysis 
Fifty two percent (52%) of participants reported an improvement in their incomes in the period 
since joining the Temo Bokamoso Credit Scheme while only thirty four percent (34%) of 
nonparticipants reported an increase in income over the corresponding period. The difference in 
incomes is in favour of those who participated in the scheme. The increase in disposable incomes 
were generally acknowledged to have enabled improvements in household welfare, by financing 
children’s education, better healthcare and other social amenities. Thirty one percent of 
participants reported a decrease in their incomes while forty one percent (41%) of nonparticipants 
claimed their income had reduced. It is pretty evident that TBCS participants in Kweneng district 
have fared better than those who did not participate in the programme. However, it is worth noting 
that of those whose fortunes were negative, eleven percent (11%) of participants declared that their 
income had reduced greatly as opposed to only three (3%) for nonparticipants. This is indicative 
of the fact though credit participation is generally beneficial, in those instances where the loan is 




Annual income from off farm Participant (%) Nonparticipant (%) Total (%) 
<5000 8.9 28.6 18.8 
5001-8000 21.4 19.6 20.5 
8001-11000 17.9 17.9 17.9 
11001-14000  10.7 8.9 9.8 
14001-17000 16.1 12.5 14.3 
17001-20000 7.1 7.1 7.1 
20001-25000 5.4 5.4 5.4 











4.4 Econometric result analysis 
4.4.1 Diagnostic tests 
The overall significance of the model has been tested using the LR statistic, which tests the joint 
null hypothesis that all slope coefficients except the constant are zero. The Chi squared statistic of 
110.07 shown in Table 4.7 is high enough to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the 
model’s goodness of fit is acceptable at 1 percent as also indicated by the probability value for LR 
statistic (0.0000). The likelihood index ratio, McFadden’s R-squared, is sufficiently high to 
suggest a strong relationship of the explanatory variables with the dependent discrete variable. 
McFadden’s Pseudo R-squared mimics the traditional OLS R-squared, but should be lower than 
that of the linear regression. As a rule of thumb, a value less than 0.2 indicates a weak relationship, 
between 0.2 and 0.4 represents a moderate relationship, and above 0.4 is generally accepted as a 
strong relationship. The Pseudo R-squared has been reported as 0.7096, which confirms a strong 
explanatory relationship of the independent variables with the dependent variable.  
 
 
Household income in last 5yrs Participants (%) Non-participants (%) Total (%) 
Increase greatly 5.6 5.4 5.5 
Increased 46.4 28.3 37.4 
Stayed the same 16.7 25.8 21.3 
Decreased 19.9 37.5 28.7 





4.4.2 Results of the logit model 
The results of the logit model, the maximum likelihood estimation, indicates that some of the 
explanatory variables included in the econometric model have a significant influence on the 
probability of participation in TBSC. These are grouped under the farmer’s socio-economic 
characteristics, farm characteristics and the bank’s institutional characteristics, presented in Table 
4.7 and discussed below.  
 










4.4.3 Explanation of significant independent variables- (Farmer characteristic) 
An interpretation for the explanatory variables that were found to be significant as per the above 
logit model results is provided below: 
 
4.4.3.1 Age (age): The theory discussed in chapter two has postulated a positive relationship 
between age and access to microfinance credit. Results of the model have supported this 
Variables  Estimated coefficients Odds ratio  Z Z> /P/ 
Farmer characteristics 
Age of the respondent (age) 0.2108542 1.234732 2.50 0.012 
Gender of the household head (sex) 0.7863108 2.195283 0.91 0.362 
Respondents’ level of education (educ) 0.8262782 2.284799 1.07 0.285 
Respondents perception of group collateral (rpgc) 4.557811 95.37446 2.91 0.004 
Number of dependents (ndep) 0.3394774 1.404214 1.12 0.264 
Previous experience of credit use (pexcr) 1.138913 3.12337 1.71 0.088 
Annual income from non-farming activities (ainf) -0.4389707 0.6446997 -0.35 0.726 
Farm characteristics  
Access to irrigation (irrig) 3.282829 26.65105 2.63 0.008 
Total size of landholding (tlh) 1.181242 3.258417 3.22 0.001 
Institutional Factors 
Distance from microfinance institution (dist) -0.0624369 0.9394723 -1.86 0.063 




postulation with a 5% level of statistical significance. Thus, the probability of participating in the 
TBSC increases by a factor of 1.234732 as the age of potential clients increases by a year. The 
same relationship was obtained by Shah et al. (2008) on Pakistan as they concluded that the older 
the household head the greater the chance of participation in a credit scheme. The rational is that 
older age is likely to be commensurate with more experience in the farming field and hence, 
increases trust and confidence of the lenders. 
 
4.4.3.2 Prior experience with credit use (pexcr):  The output of the logit model indicates that prior 
experience of credit use has a positive effect on the probability of participation, at a 10% level of 
significance. The odds ratio shows that those who had previously been involved in a formal credit 
scheme were much more likely to participate. A one unit increase in prior experience with credit 
leads to an increase 0f 3.12337 in the probability of participation. This is due to the fact that those 
with prior experience are acquainted with the benefits of microfinance and are more informed 
about the rules and regulations. Atieno (2001), obtained similar results in Kenya, indicating that 
any kind of experience, whether with formal or informal credit markets is likely to impact 
positively on participation. 
 
4.4.3.3 Respondents’ perception of group lending (rpgc): the results show that this variable 
positively impacted on participation in the programme at 1% level of statistical significance. The 
odds ratio is in support of participation as indicated by a high factor of 95.37446. Dufhues and 
Buchenreider (2005) suggested that group lending in rural markets helps to improve access to 
credit better than individual, because of the cohesive nature of rural societies. The positive and 
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significant impact of the respondents’ perception towards group lending on participation therefore 
upholds this assertion.  
 
4.4.4 Non-statistically significant variables for the farmer’s characteristic 
4.4.4.1 Gender (sex): This dummy variable took 1 if the respondent was a female and 0 if male. 
The variable weakly and positively influences participation with the odds ratio of 2.195283. The 
result contradicts the negative hypothesis depicted by Baydas et al. (1994) that women are 
discriminated against in formal financial markets. The result rather implies that being a female 
improves the chance of getting access to the Temo Bokamoso microcredit facility. Armendáriz 
and Morduch (2010) suggested that a carefully designed microfinance programme tailor-made for 
the rural population should improve access of females to the finance as they are more vulnerable 
to poverty. The result confirms the latter explanation.   
 
4.4.4.2 Respondents’ level of education (Educ): While the model result establishes the existence 
of a positive link between the level of education of the respondents and participation in the credit 
scheme, it however indicates that the relationship is statistically insignificant. The odds ratio is in 
favour of participation to increase by a factor of 2.284799 as the respondent’s literacy increases. 
Aschalew (2006) found that the educated are more likely to participate in credit programmes, not 
only in order to purchase agricultural inputs, but also to invest in farming technology and other 
non-farming activities since they tend to have other skills besides agriculture. Edith (2009) noted 





4.4.4.3 Number of dependents (Ned); the results indicate a positive correlation between the 
number of dependents and the probability of participation in the credit scheme. This positive 
relationship shows that the odds ratio in favour of the probability of participating increases with 
the number of dependents. The odds ratio in favour of participation increases by a factor of 
1.404214 as household size increases by one person. The added pressure of having to cater for 
dependents is a motivating factor in the decision to participate in TBCS. 
 
4.4.4.4 Annual income from non-farming activities (ainf): Theory predicted an ambiguous 
relationship between off-farming income and access to microfinance credit. As non-farming 
income improves the farmer’s confidence to borrow increases with respect to the ability for 
repayment (Sharma and Zeller, 1997).  However, considerable non-farm income reduces the need 
for smallholder farmers to borrow (Oboh and Kushwaha, 2009). The result obtained by the current 
study shows a weak positive influence of non-farming activities on participation.  
 
4.4.5 Explanation of the results for farm characteristics’ variables 
4.4.5.1 Availability of irrigation (irrig): One of the biggest constraints for agriculture in Botswana 
is the arid conditions. Farmers often suspend agricultural activities due to drought. Availability of 
irrigation is usually expected to impact positively on the demand for credit, since those who have 
access to irrigation would be willing to farm more hectares, leading to a need for finance. The logit 
result indicates that access to irrigation has a significant effect at the 1% level and positively 
impacts on participation in the programme. This finding augurs well with the findings of ferdisa 




4.4.5.2 Total landholding size (tlh): The theory hypothesized that total landholding size positively 
influences participation in a microfinance credit scheme. An explanation to this is twofold. First, 
land has been traditionally used as a means of collateral in rural farming stronghold areas and that 
secondly, more farming land requires higher capital. Thus, the positive result produced by the 
results of the current study explains this hypothesis. The landholding size has yielded a positive 
effect on participation at 1% with an odds ratio of 3.258417.  
 
4.4.6 Explanation of the institutional variables  
Distance from the Microfinance Institution (Dist): The results show this variable negatively 
influences participation in the scheme at a 10% level of significance. It implies that those who are 
more physically remote from the institution are less likely to participate in the credit scheme. The 
odds ratio indicates the probability of participation decreases by a factor of 0.9394723 if the 
respondent’s residence is  far from the NDB branch. This confirms the results obtained by Desale 




CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
This study set out to economically assess those micro-level factors that have an impact on rural 
smallholders’ participation in a formal credit scheme in Kweneng district, Botswana. After 
randomly selecting 112 rural households and analysing their survey data with the use of a binary 
Logit model, the study identified the determinants of participation in the microfinance scheme. 
These included some factors related to the farmer’s characteristic being the age of the household 
head, their perception of group lending, and prior experience in credit use. In addition, two farm 
characteristics which were access to irrigation and the size of the farm, and an institutional factor 
which pertains to the availability of microfinance credit facilities in proximity to the villages were 
also found to be significant determinants.  
 
These findings have parallels in the literature and conceptual framework that have been discussed 
in chapter three and four respectively. For instance, the significant effect of age on access to credit 
markets was confirmed in Pakistan by Shah et al. (2008). Group lending was found by Kifle et al. 
(2013) to improve women participation in a credit scheme in Ethiopia, while borrowing experience 
positively increased participation in Ethiopia (Yehuala, 2008). Furthermore, the negative effect of 
long distance to a credit facility goes hand in hand with the results that were obtained for a study 
in Malawi by Diagne (1999). The same author reported some positive impact of landholding size 
and access to irrigation on smallholder participation. This has also been reported in the current 




The remaining variables were statistically insignificant, but their coefficients carried important 
indications on the direction (whether positive or negative) of their effect on participation. They 
include respondents’ educational level, gender (being a female), number of dependents in the 
household and annual income from non-farming activities. The latter had a negative effect on 
participation while gender and the level of education positively affected scheme participation. 
 
A second objective was to determine the impact of participation in the credit scheme on the welfare 
of the respondent households. The study found that it had a positive and significant effect on rural 
welfare, which validates the Botswana government’s policy of investing significantly in such 
schemes through the vehicle of the National Development Bank and is in line with findings in 
studies like Atieno (2001). Finally, the third objective of recommending approaches to improving 
participation and its effectiveness is addressed in this chapter. 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
5.2.1. Policies that address the farmer’s socio-economic characteristics 
Major policy implications emerge from this study for the government of Botswana. Firstly, it 
emphasizes the importance of appreciating farmer’s socio-economic characteristics in formulating 
policies that address the demand side in developing rural credit markets. For instance development 
finance policies that promote financial support to older people who are interested in venturing into 
agricultural activities would contribute in a significant way to rural poverty alleviation. Older 
people have been shown in this study to have a greater appetite to participate in the TBSC. Similar 
innovative agro-based schemes that target older people should be extended to villages in the 
country. This would go a long way in boosting agricultural output and help the country diversify 
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its economy, which is currently heavily depended on the mining sector. The youth who are 
interested in participating in similar programmes can be encouraged to join group-based borrowing 
schemes as that provides social collateral. Most respondents in this study indicated that group 
based lending could help improve their access to finance. Therefore, the youth who are keen on 
developing their career in smallholder farming can be organized into social-based borrowing since 
age and previous experience in credit use does not favor them.   
 
5.2.2. Policies that address the farm characteristics 
Irrigation facilities and total landholding size were found to be important variables in helping 
smallholder farmers to get access to agro-finance in this study. The government can aim to promote 
potential smallholder farmers by empowering them with more land rights, including allocating 
larger plots that are fertile to them. This could take the form of an agrarian reform that embraces 
improvements in both land tenure and agricultural organization. More boreholes in areas where 
there are no dams can be dug to allow irrigation projects. The Land Board of Botswana can issue 
letters that confirms land title to the smallholder farmers to improve bankability for their projects 
on the land. In fact, properly designed land tenure would spell out a set of rights that determines 
who owns and how to use the land. This will have ramifications in all aspects which concerns 
development banks, including mortgage, size of the land, pasture, water and tenancy.  
 
5.2.3. Policies that address the Institutional characteristics 
Institutional factors were found to be important in helping to improve accessibility of finance to 
smallholder farmers. Long distances travelled by village dwellers when they need financial support 
puts them at a disadvantage. For instance, there is no NDB branch in Kweneng district and farmers 
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have to travel to Gaborone to apply or even enquire about available services. In fact all of NDB’s 
four branches are in towns and there are no branches in rural areas. This pushes smallholder 
farmers to turn to informal credit schemes. The widespread participation in informal credit betrays 
a dire necessity for farmer-oriented financial services in rural Botswana. This accentuates a need 
to link formal credit institutions with developed financial systems so that they can develop 
sustainable products that overcome the problem of geographical inaccessibility. 
 
5.3 Limitations of the study 
The study area covered only one of the 11 districts of Botswana, namely Kweneng district. The 
implication is that generalising the findings to other districts or over the national territory may not 
be valid due to socio cultural and other economic differences. Cross sectional data was also 
collected at only one period of time due to the limited time available for the study, so the findings 
may not also be applicable to the population over a more sustained period. Due to limited human 
and financial resources the study of impact on welfare was restricted to only 112 respondents and 
secondary data on the study area and population was also very limited. These conditions limited 
the thoroughness of the study. 
 
5.4 Areas of further study  
This study’s scope was limited to credit participation for smallholder farmers due to financial and 
time constraints. Future research could include other microfinance services like farming insurance, 
micro-saving, and group lending. Further research on the determinants of participation in credit 
schemes should also cover all districts of the country. Greater accuracy of results would require 
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Appendix I - Questionnaire 
 
The Determinants of participation in microfinance and its impact on rural welfare: Case Study 
of the National Development Bank Botswana’s Temo Bokamoso Lending programme in 
Kweneng District. 
 
The objective of this questionnaire is to collect information from participants and non-participants 
in the TBCS which will enable the research team to identify the factors that determine participation 
in microfinance and its impact on rural household incomes in Kweneng district. The data gathered 
will be used for research purposes only. Kindly provide genuine responses to the questions to 
optimise the validity of the study. 
 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation 
 
Section I: socio Demographic information 
1. Respondent’s Name ---------------------------------------- 
1.1. Tick as appropriate for TBCS -  Participant:    Nonparticipant 
2. Address   ----------------------------------------- 
         ----------------------------------------- 
        ----------------------------------------- 
3. Age -----------------------, Gender ----------------------- 
4. Marital status (tick):  1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced 4. Widowed 
5. Level of Educational: 1. None 2. Primary 3. Junior secondary 4. Senior secondary 5. Tertiary  
6. Profession:           1. Farmer 2. Business 3. Civil servant 4. If other specify------------------------ 
 
SECTION 2: Household livelihood information 
7. Number of dependents (Household members below 15 and above 64) --------------- 
8. What are the main sources of the household livelihood? (Tick more than one if applicable) 
Activity Tick ( √ ) the source Amount 
Farming   
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Full time employment private 
sector 
  
Full time employment public 
sector 
  
Small business   
Wage labor   
Ipelegeng grants   
Others/ specify   
 
Section 3: Credit history 
9. Did you have prior access or experience with a credit scheme? 
1=Yes 0=No 
10. If Q9 is yes, what was the purpose(s) of the loan? 
1. Purchase of land 2. Acquisition of agricultural inputs 3. Livestock purchase 4. 
Irrigation/borehole 5. Trade 5. Other, specify? ---------------------- 
11. On which date did you first join the Temo Bokamoso programme? ------------------ 
12. Have you employed any other sources of credit? 
1 = yes 0 = No 
13. If Q12 is ‘yes’, state the source?  
1) CEDA Young Farmers’ Fund 2) Village Money lenders 3) Friends/Family 4) 
Commercial Banks 6) other development programmes 7. Others specify-------------------- 
14. How often did you access these sources in the past 5 years? 
Source    Year     Amount Interest rate 
a)--------------------------------   ------------------------------   --------------------------           --------- 
b) -------------------------------   ------------------------------   --------------------------           --------- 
c) -------------------------------   ------------------------------   --------------------------           --------- 
15. Have you repaid the loan from these sources? 1= Yes 0 = No 
16. Do you consider the Temo Bokamoso repayment period to be appropriate? 1= Yes 0 =No 
17. If Q16 is no, recommend a suitable repayment period: _____________ 
18. What your experience with the service satisfactory? 1= Yes 0 = No 
18.1 What is the distance in kms from your residence to the nearest NDB branch? ---------- 
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19. What is your personal perception of group collateral? 
1. It is an option I would appreciate 2. It is not an option I would appreciate 
 
SECTION 4. WELFARE /LIVING CONDITIONS OF RESPONDENTS 
20. Please provide the following details on the assets of your household besides the farmland. 
 
Type   
Value of assets held 
before joining scheme 
                             
Value of assets held 
currently 
Furniture and fittings   
Motor vehicles   
Electronic appliances   
Farming equipment   
Livestock   
Other   
Total   
 
21. Have you made any improvements to your house since participating in Temo Bokamoso? 
1=yes 0=No 
22. If Q21 is ‘yes’ what are these improvements? 
1. Built a better house 
2. Built additional rooms 
3. Refurbished the house 
4. Other, please specify------------------------------------------------------- 
23. Do you have a title deed in your name for your farm land? 1=yes 0=No 
24. What is the size of your farm in hectares? ---------------------- 
25 Do you have access to a borehole/irrigation? 1=yes 0= no 
26. If Q23 is yes then is the farm fertile? _____ 1= fertile 0= not fertile 
27. If Q25 is ‘yes’ 
1. What percentage of the farmland did you plough on average before participating in TBSC? -- 
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2. If you do not participate, what proportion have you ploughed on average in the last 5 years? 
28. What was annual income from farming before participation? ------------.Current annual 
farming income ----------- 
29. For nonparticipants what was your annual income from farming: 5 years ago activity after 
programme participation? ------------- Currently---------- 
 
SECTION 5: Household income, and access to Medical Facilities, education and other 
social amenities 
30. Please provide average expenditure on the following in the last 5 years: 
 
Amenity Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Healthcare      
Education      
Utilities      
Leisure 
activities 
     
 
Part 6: Respondents opinions on participation 
31. Why do you think is the main reasons people participate in TBCS? 
A. To invest in the farm  B. To repay loans C. To invest in non-farming activities 
D. To purchase livestock E. To buy basic items    F. For precautionary purposes 
G. Others (specify) ___________________ 
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